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Countries around the world face a perfect storm of 
converging threats that might substantially increase 
the risk from infectious disease epidemics, despite 
improvements in technologies, communication, and 
some health systems. New pathogens emerge each 
year, some of which have high mortality and the 
potential for eﬃ  cient transmission—eg, severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS),1 Middle East respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus,2 and avian inﬂ uenza A H7N9.3 
Existing pathogens are becoming resistant to available 
antibiotics and several are now resistant to virtually 
all available treatment.4 There is also the potential 
threat of intentional release of biological agents, 
which can be developed or synthesised biologically 
and disseminated at low cost and with little scientiﬁ c 
expertise. Moreover, the accelerated pace of 
globalisation ampliﬁ es these risks: a disease is just a 
plane trip away, and an outbreak anywhere is a threat 
everywhere.
One of the primary responsibilities of any 
government is to protect the health and safety of 
its people. There are three key elements of health 
security: prevention wherever possible, early detection, 
and timely and eﬀ ective response. Although many 
countries are now better able to manage infectious 
disease threats than in the past, these improvements 
have often been small in scale and limited in scope. The 
International Health Regulations (IHR), revised by WHO 
in 2005 to more directly address new and emerging 
epidemic threats,5 require all 194 signatory countries 
to improve capacity in these and other areas as part of 
their commitment to protecting health.6 Yet, at least 
80% of countries did not report full IHR compliance by 
the 2012 deadline.7
There is a perception in some quarters that tackling 
epidemic threats is less important than addressing 
major killers, such as HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria, 
and that international eﬀ orts to stop outbreaks might 
be more in the interest of high-income than of low-
income and middle-income countries.8 In fact, epidemic 
threats are potentially devastating to development 
through economic dislocation, decreased productivity, 
avoidable medical costs, loss of revenues from tourism 
and travel, and negative incentives for investment. The 
eﬀ ective implementation of measures to ensure global 
health security builds a ﬁ rm, broad-based public health 
foundation that promotes country self-suﬃ  ciency 
and can sustain health progress in any area in which 
a country decides to focus. Most fundamentally, 
addressing epidemic threats saves lives.
Rapid progress in health security is feasible if there is 
high-level political motivation, adequate investment, 
and technical expertise. After the devastating impact of 
SARS in 2003, China launched an ambitious programme 
to improve detection of new threats, strengthen 
response capacity, and report more transparently. The 
number of inﬂ uenza surveillance laboratories grew to 
more than 400, the Chinese National Inﬂ uenza Center 
was designated as the world’s ﬁ fth WHO Collaborating 
Centre for Reference and Research on Inﬂ uenza,9 the 
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(China CDC) was greatly strengthened with training 
of ﬁ eld epidemiologists and establishment of an 
Emergency Operations Centre, and mechanisms for 
rapid reporting to WHO were put in place. When the 
inﬂ uenza A H7N9 virus began causing human illness in 
February, 2013, China was quickly able to identify and 
sequence the genome, and share the sequence globally 
within days of the ﬁ rst report, which enabled a rapid 
start on development of diagnostics and a vaccine.
Many countries have improved health security by 
preventing avoidable epidemics, detecting outbreaks 
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early, and responding eﬀ ectively. A key lesson from 
managing health crises of the past decade is that 
eﬀ ective response to emergencies cannot be done 
by having stand-by systems that are activated 
only when they are urgently needed, but requires 
strengthening day-to-day detection, response, and 
prevention programmes that can be scaled up quickly 
if needed.10 After the devastating earthquake in Haiti 
in January, 2010, the US Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) worked with the Haitian 
Ministry of Health and Population to strengthen 
disease surveillance and laboratory capacity and help 
train Haiti’s public health workforce.11 This laid the 
groundwork for rapid detection and eﬀ ective response 
to epidemic cholera,12 maintenance and expansion 
of HIV services during the cholera epidemic,13 and 
meaningful improvements to protect the health 
of Haiti’s population through disease prevention 
activities, such as expanded access and higher 
coverage with childhood vaccines, improved control 
of ﬁ lariasis, and improved HIV testing, care, and 
treatment.14
Early detection of outbreaks is vital to keep their 
impact to a minimum. In Uganda and Vietnam, with 
support from CDC and the US Department of Defense’s 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the health ministries 
enhanced existing non-proprietary information 
systems and laboratory specimen referral networks 
for real-time reporting. This approach has already led 
to early detection and subsequent initiation of timely 
public health responses to outbreaks in Uganda from 
pathogens that include Zika virus, Crimean-Congo 
haemorrhagic fever virus, hepatitis E virus, Neisseria 
meningitidis, and multidrug-resistant and extensively 
drug-resistant Mycobacterium tuberculosis. 15 The time 
from the start of an outbreak to detection and response 
has decreased substantially in Uganda, as it has in 
many other countries that have strengthened disease 
detection capacity.16
Eﬀ ective response to epidemics is greatly enhanced 
by a well trained workforce, coordinated through 
a public health Emergency Operations Centre. 
Enhanced facilities, state-of-the-art equipment, 
standard operating procedures, and objective 
assessment exercises have been part of the en-
hancements of Emergency Operations Centres in 
Uganda and Vietnam.15,17
On Feb 13, 2014, the US Government launched a new 
global health security agenda in partnership with WHO, 
the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations, the World Organization for Animal Health, as 
well as with other countries.18 The goal is to accelerate 
progress so that every country has an eﬀ ective system 
to prevent, detect, and respond to health threats. Over 
the next 5 years, the USA has committed to working 
with at least 30 countries to more eﬀ ectively protect 
at least 4 billion people from naturally occurring, 
accidental, or intentional infectious disease threats. 
We are conﬁ dent that with commitment from high-
income, middle-income, and low-income countries, 
every part of the world can better prevent, more rapidly 
detect, and eﬀ ectively respond to health threats. 
Core elements of eﬀ ective global health security are 
summarised in the panel.
The global health security eﬀ ort will also advance 
IHR implementation by prioritising key activities with 
national leadership, enlisting veterinary, agriculture, 
and other sectors where necessary and appropriate, 
and focusing on critical elements of the IHR core 
capacities.19 There has been substantial commitment 
from health leaders to implement the IHRs, both to 
Panel: Key global health security areas to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious 
disease outbreaks
Prevent—systems, policies, and procedures to mitigate avoidable outbreaks, 
including
• Surveillance to monitor and slow the emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance
• National laboratory biosecurity system
• Policies and practices that reduce the risk of zoonotic disease transmission
• Immunisation against epidemic prone diseases (90% of 1-year-old children with at 
least one dose of measles vaccine)
Detect—a national surveillance and laboratory system capable of reliable testing for 
ﬁ ve or more of ten core tests relevant to the country’s epidemiological proﬁ le on 
specimens from patients in disease clusters in more than 80% of districts and
• Standardised surveillance for three core syndromes
• Regional and national interoperable electronic reporting systems with timely reporting to 
WHO, World Organization for Animal Health, and Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations
• Multidisciplinary public health workforce with one or more epidemiologists per 
200 000 population
Respond—a national public health Emergency Operations Centre capable of 
activating an emergency response in under 120 min, including
• Trained rapid response teams
• Linkages between public health and law enforcement for suspected biological attacks 
• National framework to engage international partners during a public health emergency
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meet requirements and because of the need to protect 
their own people. However, lack of sustained attention, 
limited resources for health ministries, the need for 
additional technical assistance, and the lack of an 
objective public monitoring framework have impeded 
implementation.
The global health security technical package oﬀ ers 
speciﬁ c targets to gauge meaningful progress. 
For example, a nation that has immunised 90% 
of its children against measles by age 1 year has 
eﬀ ectively prevented one prominent epidemic threat 
and established an infrastructure that can address 
other threats that arise. A country that establishes 
a nationwide laboratory network that can reliably 
undertake at least ﬁ ve of the core tests chosen from 
their epidemiological risk proﬁ le, and is capable of 
receiving biological specimens from patient clusters 
of disease occurring in at least 80% of districts 
across the country, has a core element of an eﬀ ective 
disease detection system in place. Countries that 
have invested in a national, integrated Emergency 
Operations Centre with the capacity to mount a 
coordinated, multisectoral emergency response 
within 120 min will have the capability to mitigate an 
infectious disease outbreak or other threat of public 
health concern. Such measures improve the security of 
that country’s citizens as well as people in other parts 
of the world, and are fundamental to a strong public 
health system able to manage endemic disease and 
epidemic threats eﬀ ectively.
Global health security also focuses on long-term 
sustainability of national health security through 
public–private partnerships and the commitment of 
annual health investments that allow countries to 
become self-suﬃ  cient. Helping countries improve 
their ability to prevent, detect, and respond to 
endemic diseases, even if some of these are unlikely 
to be exported elsewhere, is important for the health 
and wellbeing of their own people and creates public 
health capacities that can address other threats. By 
focusing global health security strategies and IHR 
implementation on all potential health threats, and not 
solely on bioterror and epidemic threats, countries can 
improve health in an emergency and will be better able 
to address everyday health challenges.
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